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DISTINGUISHING CAUSAL AND NORMATIVE QUESTIONS IN
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDGING
Patrick S. Shint

In this Essay, I raise a metatheoretical question concerning the relationship

between what seem to be two distinct categories of projects that might be lumped together
under the rubric of empirical study of judicial performance. One kind of empirical project
aims broadly at developing a social-scientific theory of judging, or as one legal philosopher
recently put it, identifying the "causes" of legal decisions. [1] Another kind of project aims
at identifying quantitative, measurable criteria to provide an objective basis for evaluating
the quality of judicial performance or, to use a more loaded term, "judicial merit." [2] I

attempt to explain the distinction between these two types of projects and consider whether
the very possibility of success in the former undermines the point of the latter. Would a
theory that could predict how any given judge would likely decide any given case obviate
the usefulness of general criteria for measuring judicial quality? I suggest here that the
answer is no, because the two projects address fundamentally different types of questions.
One kind of empirical study of judicial decisionmaking might be regarded as
continuous with the broader goal of social science, which I take to be something like
understanding human behavior in general. I see the ultimate aim of this sort of empirical
inquiry as developing a theory that explains and predicts judicial decisionmaking in
roughly the same way a psychological theory might seek to explain and predict other
observed phenomena of human behavior, such as the tendency to obey authority. Just as a
successful psychological theory of obedience might, among other things, identify the
conditions that explain why and predict whether a given subject will obey an order given
by an authority figure in a particular context (for example, personal characteristics of the
subject, the subject's relation to the authority figure, the nature of the order, and its
expected consequences), one might likewise consider an empirical theory of judging in this
vein successful if it allows particular conditions to be identified-for example, political
ideology, characteristics of the litigants, particular features of a case's history, or the
provenance of relevant precedent-that explain and predict judicial outcomes. [3]
Within this broadly defined empirical project of explaining and predicting judicial

decisionmaking as human social behavior-one might call it the project of "naturalizing
jurisprudence" [4]-there are multiple theoretical perspectives that might be relevant. A
single type of observed judicial decisionmaking might be understood simultaneously
through the frameworks of sociology, political science, social psychology, cognitive
psychology, and perhaps even neuropsychology. Whether or how all these empirical
perspectives might be integrated remains unclear. Presumably, a grand unified theory of
judicial decisionmaking is no more and no less likely than a grand unified theory of human
behavior in general. All of these scientific perspectives may be viewed as having one
common, general aim: they seek to provide causal explanations of judicial decisions
theories that identify the causal predicates of observed decisions and do so with predictive
power. [5]

A second type of empirical study of judicial performance seems quite different in
its basic aim from the project of naturalizing jurisprudence. The goal of this second type of
study might broadly be described as identifying quantified measures of good judicial
performance-for example, citation counts, dissent rates, and productivity-that can be
used to assess and even rank the quality of sitting judges, judicial candidates, and courts.
This type of undertaking can be seen as a way of compiling otherwise inaccessible

information that would presumably be of significant value to public officials, the citizenry,
and judges themselves in evaluating and monitoring judicial performance. Public ratings of
judges and courts based on this information might have the added desirable effect of
sussing out the opaque criteria that various political actors use to champion particular
judges or candidates, insofar as those ratings would exert pressure on such actors to give
public explanations supporting any low-rated candidates they seek to promote. [6]
What is the relationship between these two empirical projects of naturalizing
jurisprudence and of measuring judicial performance? One possibility is that the need for
objective measures of judicial performance is a function of the current infancy of the
science of identifying the causes of judicial decisions. That is, objective measures that
serve as proxies for judicial quality are only necessary because of the lack robust theories
that would predict how a particular sort of judge would likely decide a particular sort of
case. If such a theory existed, there would be no point in trying to develop any general
measure of judicial quality.
An example may help draw out the intuitive appeal of this conjecture. Suppose one
could prove that in any case possessing the set of features F, involving a party with
characteristics P, a second party with characteristics D, and given additional specifiable
conditions C, a judge with a set of characteristics J will always decide the case in a way
that is favorable to the party with characteristics P, whereas a judge lacking J will always
decide against that party. One might argue that this postulate, if true, would undermine the
relevance of any generic notion of judicial quality-apart from whatever constitutes J
characteristics-in the context of cases with features F. If one could predict how any
particular judge would decide this type of case, there would be no need for further
information about the judge's qualities, at least in that limited context. And if analogous
predictions could be made with respect to cases with features F1, F2, and so on, and judges
with characteristics J1, J2, and so on, there would be no more reason to care about
measuring judicial quality in the context of those cases. Thus, the more progress
empiricists make in the project of reducing judicial decisionmaking to its natural causes,
the less relevance any project of measuring judicial performance will have.
One might argue, in other words, that judicial quality matters because better judges
presumably will make better decisions. But if it were possible to predict judicial decisions
in the manner postulated, then no one would have reason to care about generic measures of
judicial performance. There would be no reason to fret over proxy measures of good
judicial decisionmaking if social science could deliver a theory that directly predicts how a
particular judge or candidate would decide particular kinds of cases.
I believe that this argument should be rejected. This argument's fallacy involves its

reliance on the implicit assumption that empirical measures of judicial performance are, at
their core, nothing more than an indirect attempt to accomplish one of the goals of the
project of naturalizing jurisprudence-namely, developing a theory with the power to

predict the outcome of judicial decisions on the basis of specifiable causal predicates. But
the project of measuring judicial performance need not be assimilated to that of theorizing
the causes of judicial decisions. Rather, the project is fundamentally normative and
evaluative in character. The basic question is not about the causes of decisions, but about
what makes a good judge, or what constitute the basic virtues of a good judge. [7] Whereas

the naturalizing project seeks to provide causal explanations for judicial behavior in a
manner continuous with social science, the empirical study of judicial performance seeks to
make explicit and then reduce to numbers our value judgments about the relative merits of
selected characteristics of judicial performance. The ultimate test of a causal theory is its
explanatory and predictive power. The test of a measure of judicial performance is
ultimately the normative plausibility of its embedded value judgments about the core
virtues of a judge and how well it captures those judgments. [8] The two projects have
incommensurable aims.
There are, however, some important caveats. I do not deny the potential relevance
of the findings of naturalized jurisprudence to the project of measuring judicial
performance. For example, some observers might think that any evaluation of judicial
performance should incorporate criteria that capture something like political independence
or capacity for "nonideological" decisionmaking. [9] But what if there were empirical
evidence that indisputably established that, as a matter of fact, political affiliation almost
always predicts judicial outcomes in certain types of cases? I suspect that if that were the
case, there would be reason to doubt whether criteria aimed at measuring political
independence could possibly capture anything meaningful. Standards of judicial quality
must be tempered by contemporary knowledge regarding the limits of human psychology.
This is a consequence of the basic moral premise that "ought" at least in some sense
implies "can." To that extent, the study of the causes of judicial behavior is potentially
relevant to the project of measuring judicial quality. My point is not to deny this possible

point of congruence, but rather to emphasize that society's concept of a good judge is not
simply given by how most judges in fact tend to behave. Findings in the science of judicial
behavior cannot themselves determine the normative standards by which judges should be
measured and evaluated. This is a consequence of another basic moral premise, namely,
that "is" does not imply "ought."
The other caveat is that my remarks assume that it is possible to construct a model
of a good judge that is at least to some degree independent of considered preferences
relating to case outcomes. This assumption means, among other things, that a judgment

about whether a particular individual would make a good judge is not simply reducible to a
set of predictions about the outcomes of cases that would come before that individual. But
what if one were to reject this assumption? What if the concept of a good judge that best
reflected societal and legal norms did in fact turn out to be nothing more than a reflection
of collective preferences about case outcomes? [10] In that case, I do think that measures
of judicial performance that captured the concept might be collapsible into predictions of
judicial behavior. That is, if society's notion of a good judge turns out to be nothing more
than a set of predictions about the likelihood of a judge's reaching particular outcomes in
particular cases, then measures of judicial performance would be nothing more than proxy
predictions about what judges would probably do in such cases. It might follow, then, that
my claim-that the project of measuring judicial performance is fundamentally distinct
from the project of determining the causes of judicial decisions-depends on the
defensibility of a particular kind of concept of a good judge, namely, one that is not tied to
the desirability of specific outcomes in particular cases.
I do not think that this conclusion does, in fact, follow. Even if this sort of
cynicism about the concept of a good judge were warranted, I believe that the project of
naturalizing jurisprudence would still remain fundamentally different from the project of

quantifying judicial performance, because the latter is essentially a normative endeavor in a
way that the former is not. Even if every theorized measure of judicial performance turned
out to be nothing more than an elliptical predictor of a particular set of case outcomes,
every theorist's proposed measure of judicial performance would still be answerable to
questions about its underlying normative conception of a good judge. Empirical theories

about the causes of judicial decisions need not answer these questions.
Pretend, for example, that one could show that measures of judicial performance
that depend on citation counts tend to highly rank judges who are more likely to invalidate
legislation in federal constitutional cases. If that were true, then commentors might observe
that these performance measures are empirically reducible to predictors of how judges will
decide those kinds of constitutional cases. This finding would not, however, undermine my
central argument, which is that the project of empirically measuring judicial performance,
in contrast to the project of identifying the causes of judicial decisions, is fundamentally
normative. The discovery of a sufficiently tight predictive correlation between citation
counts and a disposition to invalidate legislation might support a claim that any interest in
the former as a measure of judicial quality is really nothing more than an indicator of a
preference for the latter outcome. But the question that this discovery would not and could
not answer is whether anyone should therefore stop using the citation count measure as a
benchmark for judicial performance. Arriving at an answer would require normative

discussion about principles of judicial evaluation-principles that specify why certain

considerations should count as legitimate reasons for or against appointing someone as a
judge. Any given measure of performance may collapse into a prediction about substantive

case outcomes. This possibility does not show, however, that the measurement project
itself collapses into a predictive one. Whatever an empirical theory of judicial performance
might in fact be measuring, it must always answer one normative question that a purely
predictive one need not answer: should the measures in question form the basis for
evaluating judges? For this reason, the project of measuring judicial performance is

inescapably normative in a way that the goal of naturalizing jurisprudence is not.
Studies of judicial performance that seek to determine judicial quality by
quantitative measures (such as citation count) will ultimately stand or fall on the strength of
the normative reasons that can be marshaled for valuing as judges the kind of individuals
who do well on those measures. Empirical measures of judicial performance ultimately
depend on normative claims about what it means for someone to be a good judge, and the
strength of any proposed empirical measure is necessarily a direct function of the strength
of the justification of those normative claims. Theories about the causes of judicial
performance do not depend on these justifications. And no purely empirical project can

supply those justifications. That is a task for normative, not empirical, inquiry.
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